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Determining the Optimal Monetary Policy
Instrument for Nigeria1
Solomon I. Udom2 and Baba N. Yaaba3
It is considered inapt for central banks to adjust reserve money (quantity of money)
and interest rate (price of money) at the same time. Thus, necessitates the need for a
choice instrument. Enough evidence abounds in microeconomic theory on the
undesirability of manipulating both price and quantity simultaneously in a free
market structure. The market, in line with the consensus among economists, either
controls the price and allows quantity to be determined by market forces, or
influence quantity, leaving prices in the hands of the forces of demand and supply.
This paper is, therefore, an attempt to examine the optimal monetary policy
instrument for Nigeria between 1981Q1 to 2013Q2 using a bounds testing approach
to cointegration. The result indicates the superiority of monetary instrument,
followed by combined instrument and then interest rate instrument. The study
therefore suggests that the CBN should lay more emphasis on monetary instrument
particularly if output growth or stability is the primary goal of monetary policy.
Keywords: Optimal monetary policy, ARDL, interest rate, monetary aggregate,
cointegration

JEL Classification Numbers: C53, E43, E47, E52
1.0

Introduction

Microeconomic theory has provided enough evidence on the undesirability of
manipulating both price and quantity simultaneously in a free market
structure. The market, in line with the consensus among economists, has the
option of either controlling the price and allow quantity to be determined by
market forces or influence quantity, leaving prices in the hands of demand and
supply. Hence, it is inapt for central banks to adjust reserve money (quantity
of money) and interest rate (price of money) at the same time. This consensus
in economic literature on the inappropriateness of the simultaneous
application of both reserve money and interest rate as monetary policy
instruments necessitates the need for a choice instrument.
Economic Literature is, however, divided on the efficacy, as well as the
superiority of the instruments. While some analysts opined that interest rate is
inferior considering its inherent inability to determine equilibrium. They also
1
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posit that indeterminacy of price or rate of inflation has posed a significant
practical problem particularly in term of zero bounds interest rate environment
citing virtually two to three decades experience of Japan4. Market regulators,
on other hand, apparently favoured interest rate, on the ground that changes in
the reserve requirement is usually too infinitesimal to make a noticeable
impact. They are of the opinion that the implementation of reserve
requirement imposes an unbearable cost on the monetary authorities.
Market Players and participants, however argued in favour of interchanging
both, negating the microeconomic principles and contending that the efficacy
of the instruments depend largely on the prevailing economic situation. They
are of the view that a weighted mixture of the two instruments can be adopted
as is the case with monetary conditions index. A view highly challenged by
Micro-economists on the ground that a combination of the two instruments
will be tantamount to a deterministic relationship between money stock and
interest rate. They also contend that it will lead to sub-optimal outcomes of
monetary policy goals.
Despite the unending debate, however, the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN)
still uses both instruments, in her monetary policy implementation framework.
This study is, therefore, an attempt to determine the most suitable of the
instruments for the Nigerian economy and/or the appropriateness of the
combined use of the instruments, so as to aid the CBN in making a decisive
policy choice.
To achieve this, the paper is divided into five sections. After this brief
introduction is section two which examines both the underlying principles and
related empirical literature. Section three explains the data, methodology and
estimation procedure, while section four analyses the results and the last
section concludes.
2.0

Conceptual Framework and Literature Review

2.1

Conceptual Framework

If the assumption of the existence of two markets (i.e. goods and money
markets) is recognised in line with the submission of Poole (1970) and
following the Hicksian version of the IS-LM model, we have:

4

See Cargill and Guerrero (2006) for more detail.
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𝑦𝑡 = 𝛿0 + 𝛿1 𝑟𝑡

(1)

𝑚𝑡 = 𝜗0 + 𝜗1 𝑦𝑡 + 𝜗2 𝑟𝑡

(2)
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Equation (1) represents a goods market – an IS function, while equation (2) is
money market – a LM function. Y is aggregate demand, r represents interest
rate and m is the money supply.
Equation (1) is a combination of consumption and investment equations
reflecting the equilibrium represented as Y = C + I. The left hand side of
equation (2) is money stock, while the right hand side represents the demand
for money. Aggregate demand is assumed to be a function of interest rate in
the goods market, which aids interest rate to influence movements in the
money market. With only three variables (y, r and m) two of which are
endogenous and one is exogenous, the central bank is expected to manipulate
either the m or the r at any particular point in time. The parameters are not
necessarily constant over time due to the influence of fiscal policy decisions
of the government.
Adding error term to both equations (1) and (2), they become:
𝑦𝑡 = 𝛿0 + 𝛿1 𝑟𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡

(3)

𝑚𝑡 = 𝜗0 + 𝜗1 𝑦𝑡 + 𝜗2 𝑟𝑡 + 𝜇𝑡

(4)

𝐸(𝜀) = 0, 𝐸(𝜇) = 0, 𝐸(𝜀 2 ) = 𝜎𝜀2 , 𝐸(𝜇 2 ) = 𝜎𝜇2 , 𝐸 (𝜀𝜇) = 𝜎𝜀𝜇 = 𝜌𝜀𝜇 , 𝜎𝜀 𝜎𝜇
Following Poole (1970) the optimal instrument is determined by ability of the
instrument to minimise the expected loss function in term of the variations
between the actual and targeted income.
If we denote the desired level of output by the central bank as y* and assume a
quadratic loss function, then the difference between actual and the targeted
level of income expected to achieve full employment can be given as:
𝑙 = 𝐸[(𝑦 − 𝑦 ∗ )2 ]

(5)

The central bank would strive to achieve r in the good market and m in the
money market that minimises the loss function.
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Following Gichuki et al. (2012), the starting point is to derive the reduced
forms of equations (3) and (4) such that the endogenous variables become
functions of the exogenous ones.
With preference for interest rate, for instance, Poole (1970) was of the view
that the minimum expected loss function is achieved when r = r*, hence if we
substitute equation (3) into equation (5), we have:
𝑀𝑖𝑛
𝑟

2

𝐸 {(𝛿0 + 𝛿1 𝑟 ∗ + 𝜀) − 𝑦 ∗ }

(6)

If we equate the derivative to zero, we have:
𝐸[2𝛿1 ((𝛿0 + 𝛿1 𝑟 ∗ + 𝜀) − 𝑦 ∗ )] = 0

(7)

If we divide through by 2δ1 and as well consider the expectations, the
equation becomes:
𝑟 ∗ = 𝛿1−1 (𝑦 ∗ − 𝛿0 )

(8)

Equation (8) has attained the optimal value for r (i.e. r*). However, to equate
the expected minimum loss function for interest rate to the variance of the IS
curve, there is the need to substitute equation (8) into equation (3) since it is
the reduced form of interest rate equation. Thus we have:
𝑦 = 𝛿0 + 𝛿1 𝛿1−1 (𝑦 ∗ − 𝛿0 ) + 𝜀
⇒ 𝑦 = 𝛿0 + 𝑦 ∗ − 𝛿0 + 𝜀
⇒ 𝑦 = 𝑦∗ + 𝜀

(9)

Substituting equation (9) into equation (5) – the loss function, yields:
2

𝑙𝑟 = 𝐸 [((𝑦 ∗ + 𝜀) − 𝑦 ∗ ) ]
𝑙𝑟 = 𝐸[𝑦 ∗ − 𝑦 ∗ + 𝜀 2 ] = 𝐸[𝜀 2 ] = 𝜎𝜀2
𝑙𝑟 = 𝜎𝜀2

(10)

Equation (10) equated the expected minimum loss to the variance of the good
market.
In case of preference for reserve money as a major instrument of monetary
policy, the reduced form becomes:
𝑦 = (𝛿1 𝜗1 + 𝜗2 )−1 [𝛿0 𝜇2 + 𝛿1 (𝑚 − 𝜗0 ) + 𝜗2 𝜀 − 𝛿1 𝜇]

(11)
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Equation (11) makes y as contained in equation (4) a function of interest rate
(r) and reserve money (m). Now, to eliminate y in the loss function, substitute
equations (3) and (4) into the loss function such that the central bank now has
to strive to attain a minimisation as given below:
2

𝑀𝑖𝑛
𝑚

𝛿0 𝜗2 + 𝜗2 𝜀 − 𝛿1 𝜇 + 𝛿1 (𝑚 − 𝜗0 )
𝐸 {[(
− 𝑦 ∗ )] }
𝛿1 𝜗1 + 𝜗2

(12)

If we take the derivatives and set the equation to zero, we have:
𝐸[

2𝛿1
𝛿0 𝜗2 + 𝜗2 𝜀 − 𝛿1 𝜇 + 𝛿1 (𝑚 − 𝜗0 )
(
) − 𝑦 ∗ ] = 0 (13)
𝛿1 𝜗1 + 𝜗2
𝛿1 𝜗1 + 𝜗2

If we consider expectations and solve for m, the equation becomes:
𝑚∗ =

𝑦 ∗ (𝛿1 𝜗1 + 𝜗2 ) − 𝛿1 𝜗2 + 𝛿1 𝜗0
𝛿1

(14)

Equation (14) has attained the optimal value for m (i.e. m*).
However, to equate the expected minimum loss function for reserve money to
the variance of the LM curve, there is the need to substitute equation (14) into
equations (3) and (4) since it is the reduced form of reserve money equation
and thereafter substitute the result into equation (5) – the loss function. Thus,
we have:
𝑙𝑚 = [(𝑦𝑟 − 𝑦

∗ )2 ]

𝜗2 𝜀 − 𝛿1 𝜇 2
= 𝐸 [(
) ]
𝛿1 𝜗1 + 𝜗2

= (𝛿1 𝜗1 + 𝜗2 )−2 𝐸[𝜗22 𝜀 2 + 𝛿12 𝜇 2 − 2𝛿1 𝜗2 𝜀𝜇]
= (𝛿1 𝜗1 + 𝜗2 )−2 [𝜗22 𝜎𝜀2 + 𝛿12 𝜎𝜇2 − 2𝛿1 𝜗2 𝜎𝜀𝜇 ]

(15)

Equation (15) has attained the minimum loss for the money market.
However, if the central bank is interested in both instruments as is the case in
Nigeria, then monetary base becomes a function of the prevailing market
interest rate, such that at zero interest rate, for instance, we have a case of
strict monetary base targeting and when interest rate approaches infinity, then
it can be taken for strict interest rate targeting.
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If money supply equation as presented by Poole (1970) is taken, then 𝑚 =
𝑐1′ + 𝑐2′ 𝑟. The combination of both interest rate and reserve money
instruments can be defined by setting the values for c1 and c2 in the above
money equation. Considering the difficulty of determining c1’ and c2’, money
supply function can be re-expressed as:
𝑐0 𝑚𝑖 = 𝑐1 + 𝑐2 𝑟𝑖

(16)

Equation (16) equated c0 to the common denominator of the optimal c1’ and
c2’.
If equations (3) and (4) are enlarged with equation (16), the values of c1 and c2
would represent the two policy instruments and the optimal policy would thus
become:
𝑐0 𝑚 = 𝑐1∗ + 𝑐2 𝑟 ∗
Where,𝑐0 = 𝜗1 𝜎𝜀2 + 𝜎𝜀𝜇
𝑐1∗ = 𝑐0 (𝜗0 + 𝜗1 𝑦 ∗ ) + (𝑦 ∗ − 𝛿0 )(𝜎𝜇2 + 𝜗1 𝜎𝜀𝜇 )
𝑐2∗ = 𝑐0 𝜗2 − 𝛿1 (𝜎𝜇2 + 𝜗1 𝜎𝜀𝜇 )

(17)

The minimum expected loss function lc is given as:
𝑙𝑐 =

𝜎𝜀2 𝜎𝜇2 (1 − 𝜌𝜀𝜇 2 )
𝜎𝜇 + 2𝜌𝜖𝜇 𝜗1 𝜎𝜀 𝜎𝜇 + 𝜗12 𝜎𝜀2

(18)

Equation (18) is the combined use of the two instruments.
2.2

Decision Rule

To be able to take decision on the superiority of one policy instrument over
the other, there is the need to compare the loss arising from each of the two
instruments as presented in equation (10) for interest rate instrument, equation
(15) in case of reserve money instrument and equation (18) for both. The ratio
of loss in the money market to loss in the goods market provides the basis for
final decision.
The following formula consequently ensued:
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𝜎𝜇2
𝜎𝜀𝜇
𝑙𝑚
2
2
2
= (𝛿1 𝜗1 + 𝜗2 ) [𝜗2 + 𝛿1 2 − 2𝛿1 𝜗2 2 ]
𝑙𝑟
𝜎𝜀
𝜎𝜀

(19𝑎)

Such that if:
𝑙𝑚
> 1, 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑖𝑠 𝑠𝑢𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑟
(19𝑏)
𝑙𝑟
𝑙𝑚
< 1, 𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑒 𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑦 𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑖𝑠 𝑠𝑢𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑟 (19𝑐)
𝑙𝑟
𝑙𝑐 < 𝑙𝑟 , 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑜𝑓 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑡𝑤𝑜 𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠 𝑖𝑠
𝑠𝑢𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑟 𝑡𝑜 𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒 (19𝑑)
𝑙𝑐 < 𝑙𝑚 , 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑜𝑓 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑡𝑤𝑜 𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠 𝑖𝑠
𝑠𝑢𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑟 𝑡𝑜 𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑒 𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑦 (19𝑒)
2.3

Related Literature

The debate on the suitability of either interest rate or money supply as an
appropriate instrument of monetary policy was ignited with the introduction of
k-percent rule by Friedman in 1960. Friedman contends that central banks
should grow money supply by a predetermined amount (the k-variable) each
year to contend inflationary spiral, regardless of the cyclical state of the
economy. Specifically, Friedman proposed the growth rate of money supply to
equal the growth rate of gross domestic product (GDP) each year. Poole
(1970) proved that money stock is more relevant than interest rate to stabilise
the economy in case of distortion in equilibrium output arising from shift in IS
curve.
James and VanHoose (2000) adopts an extended version of Cukierman’s
(1992) model of monetary policy discretion, private information and
credibility to an endogenous quantity of money, where central banks have to
choose between bank reserves or interest rate as a monetary policy instrument.
With the hindsight of exploring the determinants of credibility for the
alternative policy instruments, as well as weigh the level of political influence
on the choice of policy instrument by the monetary authority. The results
reveal that Poole criterion on the choice of monetary policy instrument is just
one out of many problems faced by central banks when there is political
pressure. The results also show that even if interest rate instrument yields a
relatively higher precision vis-à-vis reserve-oriented policy, a natural bias
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towards the preference for interest rate policy will still emerged especially if
the credibility gain arising from the use of interest rate is high.
Widjaja and Mardanugraha (2009) apply a combination of mathematical and
econometric models to determine the optimal monetary policy instrument for
Indonesian economy. The study covered the period 1993Q1-2006Q4. The
results indicate that, although the setting of the nominal interest rate policy
was not in line with inflationary trend during the studied period, the varying
concerns of the Indonesian Central Bank with regard to inflation stability or
output growth do not largely explain the direction of the nominal interest rate
policy. Hence, they suggested that the Bank of Indonesia should concentrate
on enhancing output growth, considering its insignificant influence on the
changes in nominal interest rate.
Pongsaparn (2001) employ an eclectic approach ranging from basic tests and
single equation to VAR as well as rolling regression and vector error
correction model to determine the optimal monetary policy instrument for
Thailand between 1986 and 2001.The result shows positive relationships
between the level of financial development, monopoly power (uniqueness) in
exports, strength of the country’s institutions and the efficiency of interest rate
as a monetary policy instrument. They submitted that interest rate was the
most effective monetary policy instrument for Thailand during the studied
period. The unsuitability of exchange rate regime and monetary targeting was
attributed to the economic structure of the country.
Giannoni (2002) develop a model based on a property of zero-sum two-player
games to determine a robust optimal monetary policy rules particularly in a
situation of uncertainties about the parameters of the structural model. He then
applied it to an optimal Taylor rules in a simple forward-looking
macroeconomic model. The results, contrary to the common belief that
monetary policy should be less responsive in case of parameter uncertainty,
show stronger reaction of nominal interest rate to fluctuations in the rate of
inflation and output gaps as against the period of certainty.
Giannoni and Woodford (2003) estimate an optimal monetary policy rules for
different variants of a simple optimizing model of the monetary transmission
mechanism with sticky prices and wages. The results show interest rate feedback rules is a good representative of robust optimal rules but not in the form
proposed by Taylor (1993). They submitted that a robust optimal rule is in
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most cases an implicit rule which requires the use of structural model to
project the growth rate of the economy under a given policy prescription.
Giannoni (2007) exemplifies a robust optimal policy rule in a forward-looking
model, under conditions of policy maker’s uncertainty about model
parameters and shock processes. The result indicates that an optimal policy
rule requires a robust reaction of the interest rate to movements in both
inflation and output gaps as compared to the case when policy makers are
certain about model parameters and shock processes. They, therefore,
conclude that although the parameter uncertainty is not necessary for a trivial
response of monetary policy to distress but it is capable of enlarging the
degree of apathy required by optimal monetary policy.
Svensson and Williams (2008) use a Markov Jump Linear-Quadratic (MJLQ)
approach to design an optimal monetary policy instruments under uncertainty.
Various discrete models were used to estimate different types of uncertainties
that policy makers contend with. With Markov chain and mode-dependent
linear-quadratic approximations of the underlying model, the authors apply
algorithms to analyze effects of uncertainties as well as potential gains in a
New Keynesian Phillips curve model. The results show that new initiatives by
central banks significantly affect losses.
Orphanides and Williams (2008) under rational expectations hypothesis asses
the robustness characteristics of optimal control policies. They assumed that
agents do not only have insufficient knowledge about the structure of the
economy but also form expectations based on forecasting models that are
formulated and updated based on the available data. The results show that the
optimal control policy based on rational expectations performs poorly when
expectations do not coincide with rational expectations. They proved that the
efficiency of the optimal control policy can be enhanced simply by detaching
the importance attach to stabilization of real economic activity and interest
rates vis-à-vis the inaction in the central bank loss function.
Bhattacharya and Rajesh (2008) used a micro-founded model of money under
an overlapping generation’s economy in which information asymmetry and
stochastic relocation creates an endogenous transactions role for fiat money.
The results show that welfare is higher under monetary growth targeting, in
term of real shocks than during nominal shocks. The result further suggests
the optimality of an expansionary policy under inflation targeting than as
against money growth targeting.

38

Determining the Optimal Monetary Policy in Nigeria

Udom & Yaaba

Dotsey and Hornstein (2011) in their study find that the non-uniqueness of
Markov-perfect equilibria as claimed in the literature is sensitive to the
instrument in use. A unique Markov-perfect steady state and point-in-time
equilibria exists, if the central bank, for instance, uses nominal interest rate
rather than nominal money balances. This according to them makes monetary
policy solely implementable when interest rate is in use as against money
stock instrument.
Gichuki et al. (2012) apply an error correction model (ECM) on Kenyan data
from period 1994 to 2010. The results show that interest rates is more
effective than reserve money as it yielded the least minimum loss in output
when compared with reserve money instrument. However, a combination of
both instruments minimizes losses from equilibrium output far better than the
other two instruments consider separately. They, therefore, concluded that,
Central Bank of Kenya (CBK) should rely more on interest rate, if it desires to
use only one instrument at a time, but in case the CBK wishes to utilize both
instrument, it should construct a monetary conditions index to determine the
degree of adjustment of each of the variable that would yield the desired
monetary policy outcome. This according to them will help the Bank on the
implementation of a combined instrument policy.
Naoyuki et al. (2012) develop a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model
for small open economies of Singapore and Thailand covering the period
1997Q3–2006Q2. The model was used to derive a simple basket weight rule.
Although, the result was said to be sub-optimal but comparison among
cumulative losses associated with the policy instrument rules, show that the
use of a basket weight rule is superior to other instrument rules particularly in
a free floating regime.
Vargas and Cardozo (2012) use three distinct models to determine the
conditions for the efficacy of reserve requirements as an optimal monetary
policy framework especially in an inflation targeting regime for Colombia.
The central bank is expected to minimize an objective function that depends
on deviations of the objective function from its target. (i.e. inflation from its
target, output gap from its target and/or deviations of reserve requirements
from its optimal long term level). The results show that, optimal monetary
policy, in a closed economy model for instance, entails setting reserve
requirements at their long term level, while fine-tuning the interest rate in
accordance with the prevailing macroeconomic environments.
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3.0

Empirical Implementation, Data Issues and Sample Period

3.1

Empirical Implementation

The study adopts autoregressive distributed lag (ARDL) approach developed
by Pesaran et al. (2001) to estimate equations (3) and (4). The choice of the
ARDL is based on several considerations. First, the model does not require
stationarity of the data. In other words, the model can be applied irrespective
of whether the underlying regressors are stationary at I(0) or I(1) or a mixture
of both. Second, it has a small sample property. Third, it provide unbiased
estimate of the long-run model as well as valid t-statistics even when some of
the regressors are endogenous (Harris and Sollis, 2003).
Following Pesaran et al. (2001) the ARDL formats of equations (3) and (4)
are:
𝑚

𝑛

∆𝑙𝑦𝑡 = 𝛿0 + 𝛿1 𝑙𝑦𝑡−1 + 𝛿2 𝑟𝑡−1 + ∑ 𝜑1 ∆𝑙𝑦𝑡−𝑖 + ∑ 𝜑2 ∆𝑟𝑡−𝑖
𝑖=0

+ 𝜇𝑡

𝑖=0

(20)
𝑚

𝑛

∆𝑙𝑚𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝑙𝑚𝑡−1 + 𝛽2 𝑙𝑦𝑡−1 + 𝛽3 𝑟𝑡−1 + ∑ 𝛾1 ∆𝑙𝑚𝑡−𝑖 + ∑ 𝛾2 ∆𝑙𝑦𝑡−𝑖
𝑜

+ ∑ 𝛾3 ∆𝑟𝑡−𝑖 + 𝜇𝑡

𝑖=0

𝑖=0

(21)

𝑖=0

Where y is the real gross domestic product, r represents real interest rate, m is
real money supply (M2), l is natural logarithm, ∆ is the first difference, µ is an
error term while β0 to β3, φ1 to φ2, δ0 to δ2 as well as γ1 to γ3are coefficient of
the respective variables. Note also that δ0 and δ2 in equation (20) is the same
as δ0 and δ1 as presented in equation (3), while β0, β2and β3 in equation (21)
are the equivalents of φ0, φ1 and φ2 in equation (4). Note that optimal lag
length is determined automatically using Bayesian information Criterion in
Microfit 4.1.
Following the Granger representation theorem, when variables are cointegrated, there is an error correction model (ECM) that describes adjustment
of the co-integrated variables towards equilibrium values. Hence, the general
error correction representation of equations (20) and (21) are formulated as:
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𝑛

∆𝑙𝑦𝑡 = 𝜑0 + ∑ 𝜑1 ∆𝑙𝑦𝑡−𝑖 + ∑ 𝜑2 ∆𝑟𝑡−𝑖 + Ω𝐸𝐶𝑡−1
𝑖=0

𝑖=0

𝑚

𝑛

(22)

𝑜

∆𝑙𝑚𝑡 = 𝛾0 + ∑ 𝛾1 ∆𝑙𝑚𝑡−𝑖 + ∑ 𝛾2 ∆𝑙𝑦𝑡−𝑖 + ∑ 𝛾3 ∆𝑟𝑡−𝑖
𝑖=0

𝑖=0

+ 𝜁𝐸𝐶𝑡−1

𝑖=0

(23)

Where EC = error correction term from equations (20) and (21), respectively.
According to Pesaran, et al. (2001), two stages are involved in estimating
equations (20) and (21). First, the null hypothesis of the non-existence of the
long run relationship among the variables is defined by Ho: δ1 = δ2= 0 for
equation (20) and β1=β2= β3 = 0 for equation (21). Ho is tested against the
alternative of H1: not Ho. rejecting the null hypothesis implies that there exists
a long run relationship among the variables irrespective of the integration
properties of the variables. Two sets of critical values are tabulated with one
set assuming all variables are I(1) and the other I(0). This provides a band
covering all possible classifications of the variables into I(1) and I(0). If the
calculated F-statistics lies above the upper level of the band, the null
hypothesis is rejected, implying that there is co-integration, if it lies below the
lower level of the band; the null cannot be rejected, indicating lack of cointegration. If the F-statistics falls within the band, the result is inconclusive.
3.2

Data Issues and Sample Period

To estimate the equation, quarterly data spanning the period 1981Q1 to
2013Q2 is employed. The data set is obtained from the publications of the
Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) and National Bureau of Statistics (NBS).
4.0

Empirical Results

4.1

Time Series Properties of the Data

The study deployed various techniques to test the presence of unit root in the
series. Among which are Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) based on Akaike
Information Criterion (AIC), Schwarz Information Criterion (SIC) and
Hannan-Quinn Criterion (HQC), as well as Phillips-Perron (PP). Table 1
shows that all the series are I(1) variables and significant at 1.0 per cent. This
reveals that the data does not contain I(2) series, hence provides support for
the use of ARDL model.
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Table 1: Unit-Root Test (Augmented Dickey-Fuller and Phillips-Perron)
Variable

Augmented Dickey Fuller
AIC

P-P test statistics

SBC

HQ

Level

First Diff.

Level

First Diff.

Level

First Diff.

Level

First Diff.

m

2.519087

-4.552947*

2.179513

-11.75693*

2.179513

-11.75693*

2.592992

-11.80885*

y

0.960944

-5.242515*

1.849953

-15.95531*

1.849953

-5.242515*

1.050033

-12.71563*

r

-0.313438

-6.584713*

-0.451111

-10.35853*

-0.238211

-10.35853*

-0.447289

-11.46957*

Note: * significant at 1%.

From Table 2, the calculated F-statistics (i.e. 56.3 for equation 20 and 14.2 for
equation 21) indicate that the null of no co-integration can be rejected at 0.05
per cent level for both equations since they are higher than the upper bound
critical value of 4.85 and 4.35 at 0.05 per cent for IS and LM equations,
respectively as tabulated in Pesaran et al. (2001). This implies that a long-run
relationship exist among the examined variables.
Table 2: Estimate d Long-Run Coe fficie nts ARDL (4, 0)
Se le cte d Base d on Schwarz Baye sian Crite rion
Dependent Variable: LY - (IS Equation 20)
Variable s

R

2

Coe fficie nt

t-Statistic

Prob-Value s

δ0

-4.0573

-0.8120

0.4180

δ2

10.7025

2.1202

0.0360

F-Stat = (5, 120) =56.351 [0.000]

= 0.99
2

Adjusted - R = 0.99

DW = 1.66

AIC = 177.1320, SBC = 168.6232

Estimate d Long-Run Coe fficie nts ARDL (2, 0, 0)
Se le cte d Base d on Schwarz Baye sian Crite rion
Dependent Variable: LM - (LM Equation 21)
β0

-0.4437

-0.7437

β2

1.1395

15.5278

0.000

β3

-0.0746

-0.1369

0.8910

R 2 = 0.99

0.4590

F-Stat = (4, 121) =14.2356 [0.000] DW = 2.0561
2

Adjusted - R = 0.99

AIC = 208.5662, SBC = 201.4754

The relevant critical values for unrestricted intercept and no trend under
2 variables for 0.05 is 3.79 - 4.85 and 3.25 - 4.35 for 3 variables. They
are obtained from Pesaran et al. (2001) CI(iii) Case III.

Table 2 indicates that both models are well fitted as the independent variables
̅2 ) influence on the dependent variables in both
exert about 99.0 per cent (R
equations. The results of the error correction models (ECM), presented in
Table 3 yield statistically significant negative coefficients.
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Table 3: Error Correction Estimates of the ARDL Models
Dependent Variable: ΔLY - Equation 22 - The IS Market
Regressors
Coefficient
t-Stats
-0.053
-1.030
θ0
-0.532
-6.559
θ1 (-1)

Prob. Values
0.305
0.000

θ1 (-2)

-0.240

0.914

0.010

θ2
θ2 (-3)
Ω

0.139
-0.396

3.279
-5.018

0.001
0.000

-0.013

-2.008

0.047

2

R = 0.43
DW = 1.66
F-Stat = (5, 120) =17.6957 [0.000]
Adjusted - R2 = 0.40
Dependent Variable: ΔLM - Equation 23 - The LM Market
-0.031
0.768
γ0

0.444

γ1 (-1)

-0.257

-3.028

0.003

γ2
γ3
ζ

0.079
0.005

2.342
0.133

0.021
0.894

-0.069

-2.361

0.020

2

R = 0.14
Adjusted - R2 = 0.10

DW = 2.0561
F-Stat = (4, 121) =4.8506 [0.000]

The stability of the estimated parameters are tested for both the IS and LM
equations using cumulative sum (CUSUM) of recursive residual and
cumulative sum of squares (CUSMSQ) of recursive residual tests.

Plot of Cumulative Sum of Recursive
Residuals
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of Recursive Residuals
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Figure 1: Cumulative Sum of Recursive Residuals

2013Q2
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All the CUSUM and CUSUMSQ show that the estimated parameters of the
analysed equations are stable, given that the recursive errors lie within the
critical lines of 0.05 per cent.
4.2

Determining an Optimal Instrument for Nigeria

The residuals of equations (20) and (21) yield the following standard
deviations and variances:
𝜎𝜀 = 0.056791, 𝜎𝜇 = 0.044604, 𝜎𝜀2 = 0.0032252,
𝜎𝜇2 = 0.0019895 and 𝜎𝜀𝜇 = 0.050961
Note that from Table 2, δ0 = -4.0573, δ1= 10.7025, φ0 =-0.44369, φ1 = 1.1395
and φ2 =-0.074615. Note also that from equation (4), E(ɛµ) = σɛµ = ρɛµ, σɛσµ.
It, therefore, follows that:
𝜎𝜀𝜇 = 𝜌𝜀𝜇 , 𝜎𝜀 𝜎𝜇
∴ 𝜌𝜀𝜇 =

(24)

𝜎𝜀𝜇
0.050961
=
= 20.11777
𝜎𝜀 𝜎𝜇
0.00253

(25)

∴ 𝜌𝜀𝜇 = 20.11777 and 𝜌𝜀𝜇 2 = 404.724
From the loss in interest rate instrument as represented in equation (10), we
have:
𝑙𝑟 = 𝜎𝜀2
∴ 𝑙𝑟 = 0.0032252

(24)

Following equation (15) depicting the loss in monetary instrument:
𝑙𝑚 = (10.7025 ∗ 1.1395 − 0.074615)−2 [−0.0746152 ∗ 0.0032252
+ 10.70252 ∗ 0.0019895
− 2(10.7025 ∗ −0.074615 ∗ 0.05091)]
𝑙𝑚 = 0.002105

(25)

In line with equations (19b) and (19c), thus:
𝑙𝑚
0.002105
=
= 0.652673
𝑙𝑟
0.0032252
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From the results presented above, one can conclude that monetary instrument
is more effective than interest rate instrument, given that:
𝑙𝑚
<1
𝑙𝑟
For the combination policy as reported in equation (18), we have:
𝑙𝑐 =

0.0032252 ∗ 0.0019895(1 − 404.724)
0.044604 + 2(0.5454041) + 1.13952 ∗ 0.0032252

𝑙𝑐 = −0.0023

(26)

𝑙𝑐 < 𝑙𝑚 < 𝑙 𝑟

(27)

Equation (27) implies that, the combination policy is the most optimal,
followed by monetary aggregate and then interest rate policy.
The result of the study is in line with that of Bhattacharya and Rajesh (2008)
for the US, who contends that the target of monetary instruments in enhancing
welfare is robust even during economic shocks. It also corroborates that of
Vargas and Cardozo (2012) for Columbia who reported that setting reserve
requirement at their long term level is optimal for monetary policy. The study,
however, only partially agrees with that of Gichuki et al. (2012) and Naoyuki
et al. (2012). For Gichuki et al., while the combination instruments far more
minimises the loss function, interest rate instrument yielded a minimum loss
function comparatively to reserve instrument. Naoyuki et al. also submitted
that a basket weight of the instruments is superior to the use of either
instrument.
The result does not, however, conform to that of Pongsarpan (2001), Giannoni
(2002), Giannoni and Woodford (2003), Giannoni (2007), Orphanides and
Williams (2008) and Dotsey and Hornstein (2011) who all reported the
superiority of interest rate over other instruments.
5.0

Conclusion and Policy Implication

The strong rebuff of the simultaneous manipulation of both price and quantity
in a free market structure has ignited a search for the optimal monetary policy
instrument to be adopted by the central banks in their monetary policy
operations. The market, following the consensus among micro-economists
should either control the price or quantity at any particular point in time but
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not the two together. Despite this exceptional submission, most central banks
across the globe still, at least occasionally, resort to the twin instruments,
especially in term of crisis. This paper examined the optimal monetary policy
instrument for the Central Bank of Nigeria between 1981Q1 to 2013Q2 using
a bounds testing approach to cointegration. The results provide a strong
support for the optimality of monetary instrument over interest rate instrument
but show that a combination of both instrument is superior to the two used
separately.
This result tends to be in tandem with the notion that monetary policy actions
of the central banks affect credit supply majorly through money supply.
Monetary policy tightening by the CBN, particularly via reserve instruments5,
contracts money supply, hence squeezes credit supply by the Deposit Money
Banks (DMBs) via increase in interest rate. This process occurs even in an
exceptional money demand environment. In a nutshell, therefore, the interest
rates elasticity of money demand, is in this case, rendered less effective, while
ability of credit supply to vary interest rate is strengthened, thereby bringing
to fore the laws of supply.
The result, by extension shows that, the influence of CBN on money supply is
far more significant than her influence on credit supply, because, the monetary
base is the most important determinant of total supply of credit which the
CBN has less influence to vary. With insignificant influence on credit supply,
it becomes difficult for the Bank to considerably affect the equilibrium level
of interest rates. This is why the CBN, regardless of her effort, can hardly
achieve the low lending rate being advocated for several years now.
Therefore, the occasional achievement of fall in interest rate in Nigeria, to a
large extent, is an after-effect of the impact of monetary policy actions on
money supply and not credit supply.
Generally speaking, this type of development could have probably informed
Friedman (1999) submission that the influence of Federal Reserve Bank on
supply of credit in the US is negligibly too small to have remarkable effect on
interest rate and hence concludes that the CBs influence on interest rate can
only be attributed to her monopoly in the supply of reserves and not her
influence on the supply of credit. If the CBs increase reserves, credit by the
commercial banks to households and firms declined. The competitive pursue
of the limited supply escalates interest rate.
5

The interest rate channel could also occur if via interest rate but with relatively less severity.
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Following the above, the study, therefore, suggests that the CBN should
continue the use of the combined instruments as it is more effective than the
use of a single instrument. However, if the CBN has preference for the use of
a single instrument, emphasis should be placed on monetary instrument,
particularly when output growth or stability is the primary goal of monetary
policy6.
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